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Abstract—The identity problem today is a data-sharing prob-
lem. Today the fixed attributes approach adopted by the consumer
identity management industry provides only limited information
about an individual, and therefore is of limited value to the service
providers and other participants in the identity ecosystem. This
paper proposes the use of the Open Algorithms (OPAL) paradigm
to address the increasing need for individuals and organizations to
share data in a privacy-preserving manner. Instead of exchanging
static or fixed attributes, participants in the ecosystem will be able
to obtain better insight through a collective sharing of algorithms,
governed through a trust network. Algorithms for specific data-
sets must be vetted to be privacy-preserving, fair and free from
bias.
Keywords—Digital identity; Open algorithms; Data privacy;
Trust networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Open Algorithms (OPAL) paradigm seeks to address
the increasing need for individuals and organizations to share
data in a privacy-preserving manner [1]. Data is crucial to
the proper functioning of communities, businesses and gov-
ernment. Previous research has indicated that data increases
in value when it is combined. Better insight is obtained when
different types of data from different areas or domains are com-
bined. These insights allows communities to begin addressing
the difficult social challenges of today, including better urban
design, containing the spread of diseases, detecting factors that
impact the economy, and other challenges of the data-driven
society [2], [3].
Today there are a number of open challenges with regards
to the data sharing ecosystem:
• Data is siloed: Today data is siloed within organiza-
tional boundaries, and the sharing of raw data with
parties outside the organization remains unattainable,
either due to regulatory constraints or due to business
risk exposures.
• Privacy is inadequately addressed: The 2011 World
Economic Forum (WEF) report [4] on personal data
as a new asset class finds that the current ecosys-
tems that access and use personal data is fragmented
and inefficient. For many participants, the risks and
liabilities exceed the economic returns and personal
privacy concerns are inadequately addressed. Current
technologies and laws fall short of providing the
legal and technical infrastructure needed to support
a well-functioning digital economy. The rapid rate of
technological change and commercialization in using
personal data is undermining end-user confidence and
trust.
• Regulatory and compliance: The introduction of the
EU General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) [5]
will impact global organizations that rely on the In-
ternet for trans-border flow of raw data. This includes
cloud-based processing sites that are spread across the
globe.
Similarly, today there are a number of challenges in the
identity and access management space, notably in the area of
consumer identity:
• Identity tied to specific services: Most digital “iden-
tities” (namely identifier strings such as email ad-
dresses) are created as an adjunct construction to
support access to specific services on the Internet. This
tight coupling between digital identifiers and services
has given rise to the unmanageable proliferation of
user-accounts on the Internet.
• Massive duplication of data: Together with the pro-
liferation of user-accounts comes the massive dupli-
cation of personal attributes across numerous service
providers on the Internet. These service providers are
needlessly holding the same set of person-attributes
(e.g. name, address, phone, etc.) associated with a
user.
• Lack or absence of user control: In many cases users
have little knowledge about what data is collected by
service provider, how the data was collected and the
actions taken on the data. As such, end-users have no
control over the other usages of their data beyond what
was initially consented to.
• Diminishing trust in data holders or custodians: The
laxity in safeguarding user data has diminished social
trust on the part of users in entities which hold their
data. Recent attacks on data repositories and theft
of massive amounts of data (e.g. Anthem hack [6],
Equifax attack [7], etc.) illustrates this ongoing prob-
lem.
• Misalignment of incentives: Today customer-facing
service providers (e.g. online retail) have access only
to poor quality user data. Typically such data is
obtained from data aggregators who in turn collate an
incomplete picture of the user through various back-
channel means (e.g. “scraping” various Internet sites).
The result is a high cost to service providers for new
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Fig. 1: Overview of Web Single Sign On (Web-SSO)
customer on-boarding, coupled with low predictive
capabilities of the data.
The identity problem today is in reality a data-sharing
problem. The overall goal of this paper is to provide an
alternate architecture for identity management based on the
open algorithms paradigm. Key to this approach is the notion
of sharing information in a privacy-preserving manner based
on vetted algorithms, instead of the exchange of fixed attributes
approach that has prevailed in the identity industry for the past
two decades.
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. Sec-
tion II provides a brief history and overview of identity
management and federation, providing some definitions of the
entities and their functions. Readers familiar with the IAM
industry and the current identity federation landscape can skip
this section.
Section III provides further detail the concepts and prin-
ciples underlying the open algorithms paradigm. Section IV
addresses the open algorithms paradigm in the context of
identity federation, while Section V briefly discusses the need
for a legal trust framework to share algorithms. Section VI
briefly touches on the topic of subject consent.
The paper closes with a discussion regarding possible
future directions for the open algorithms paradigm.
II. IDENTITY FEDERATION AND ATTRIBUTE SHARING:
A BRIEF HISTORY
Today Identity and Access Management (IAM) represents
a core component of the Internet. IAM infrastructures are
an enabler which allows organizations to achieve its goals.
Enterprise-IAM (E-IAM) is already a mature product cate-
gory [8] and E-IAM systems are already well integrated into
other enterprise infrastructures, such as directory services for
managing employees and corporate assets. The primary goal
of E-IAM systems is to authenticate and identify persons (e.g.
employees) and devices as they enter the enterprise boundary,
and to enforce access control driven by corporate policies.
In the case of Consumer-IAM (C-IAM) systems, the pri-
mary goal there is to reduce friction between the consumer and
the online service provider (e.g. merchant) through a mediated-
authentication process, using a trusted third party referred to
as the Identity Provider.
A. Web Single Sign-On & Identity Providers
Historically, notion of the identity provider entity emerged
starting in the late 1990s in response to the growing need
to aid users in accessing services online. During this early
period, a user would typically create an account and credentials
at every new service provider (e.g. online merchant). This
cumbersome approach, which is still in practice today, has led
to a proliferation of accounts and duplication of the same user
attributes across many service providers.
The solution that emerged became what is known today
as Web Single Sign-On (Web-SSO) [9]. The idea is that a
trusted third party referred to as the Identity Provider (IdP)
would mediate the authentication of the user on behalf of
the service provider. This is summarized in Figure 1. When
a user visits a merchant website (Step 1), the user would
be redirected to the IdP to perform authentication (Steps 2–
4). After the completion of a successful authentication event,
the IdP would redirect the user’s browser back to the calling
merchant (Step 5), accompanied by an IdP-signed assertion
stating that the IdP has successfully authenticated the user.
The merchant would then proceed transacting with the user
(Step 6).
In order to standardize this protocol behavior, in 2001 an
alliance of over 150 companies and organizations formed an
industry consortium called the Liberty Alliance Project. The
main goal of this consortium was to “establish standards,
guidelines and best practices for identity management” [10].
Several significant outcomes for the IAM industry resulted
from Liberty Alliance, two among which were: (a) the
standardization of the Security Assertions Markup Language
(SAML2.0) [11], and (b) the creation of a widely used
open source SAML2.0 server implementation called Shibbo-
leth [12].
Today SAML2.0 remains the predominant Web-SSO tech-
nology used within Enterprise IAM, which is directly related
to the type of authentication protocol dominant in enterprise
directory services [13], [14], [15].
In the Consumer IAM space, the growth of the web-
applications industry has spurred the creation of the OAuth2.0
framework [16] based on JSON web tokens. Similar to the SSO
pattern, the purpose of this framework is to authenticate and
authorize an “application” to access a user’s “resources”. The
OAuth2.0 model follows the traditional notion of delegation
where the user as the resource-owner authorizes an applica-
tion, such as a Web Application or Mobile Application, to
access the user’s resources (e.g. files, calendar, other accounts,
etc). In contrast to SAML2.0 which requires the user to be
present at the browser to interact with the service provider, in
OAuth2.0 the user can disconnect after he or she authorizes the
application to access his or her resources. In effect the user is
delegating control to the application (to perform some defined
task) in the absence of the user.
Although the OAuth2.0 design as defined in [16] lacks
details for practical implementation and deployment, a fully
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Fig. 2: Identity Federation and Attribute Sharing
fledged system is defined in the OpenID-Connect 1.0 proto-
col [17] specification based on the OAuth2.0 model. It is this
OpenID-Connect 1.0 protocol (or variations of it) which is
today deployed by the major social media platforms in the
Consumer-IAM space.
B. Identity Federation
The notion of federation among identity providers arose
from a number of practical needs, one being that of the scaling
of services. The idea is quite straightforward and extends from
the previous scenario of a user seeking access to a service
provider or relying party (i.e. online merchant). This is shown
in Figure 2. The problem was simply the following: when the
relying party directs the user to an IdP with whom the relying
party has a business relationship, there was a chance that the
user will be unknown to that IdP. As such, the solution is
for a group of IdPs to “network together” in such a way that
when one IdP is faced with an unknown user, the IdP can
inquire with other IdPs in the federation. The federation model
opens-up other interesting possibilities, including the possible
introduction of the so-called attribute provider (AtP) entity
whose primary task is to issue additional useful assertions
about the user.
More formally, the primary goal of a federation among
a group of identity providers (IdP) is to share “attribute”
information (assertions) regarding a user [18], [19]:
• An Identity Provider is the entity (within a given
identity system) which is responsible for the iden-
tification of persons, legal entities, devices, and/or
digital objects, the issuance of corresponding identity
credentials, and the maintenance and management of
such identity information for Subjects.
• An attribute is a specific category of identifying in-
formation about a subject or user. Examples for users
include name, address, age, gender, title, salary, health,
net worth, driver’s license number, Social Security
number, etc.
• An Attribute Provider (AtP) is a third party trusted as
an authoritative source of information and responsible
for the processes associated with establishing and
maintaining identity attributes. An Attribute Provider
asserts trusted, validated attribute claims in response to
attribute requests from Identity Providers and Relying
Parties. Examples of Attribute Providers include a
government title registry, a national credit bureau, or
a commercial marketing database.
• An Identity Federation is the set of technology, stan-
dards, policies, and processes that allow an organiza-
tion to trust digital identities, identity attributes, and
credentials created and issued by another organization.
A federated identity system allows the sharing of
identity credentials issued, and identity information
asserted, by one or more Identity Providers with
multiple Relying Parties (RP).
• A Relying Party or Service Provider (RP) is system
entity that decides to take an action based on informa-
tion from another system entity. For example, a SAML
relying party depends on receiving assertions from
an authoritative asserting party (an identity provider)
about a subject [19].
Although the federated identity model using the SSO flow
pattern remains the predominant model today for the consumer
space, there are a number of limitations of the model – both
from the consumer privacy perspective and from the service
providers business model perspective:
• Identity management as an adjunct service: Most large
scale consumer-facing identity services today are a
side function to another more dominant service (e.g.
free email service, free social media, etc.).
• Limited access to quality data: Service providers and
relying parties are seeking better insights into the
user, beyond the basic attributes of the user. However,
other than the major social media providers today, the
relying parties today do not have access to rich data
regarding the user.
Today the scope of attributes or claims being
exchanged among federated identity providers is fairly
limited (e.g. user’s name, email, telephone, etc.) and
thus of little value to the relying party. An example
of the list of claims can be found in the OpenID-
Connect 1.0 core specifications (Section 5.1 on Stan-
dard Claims in [17]) for federations deploying the
OpenID-Connect architecture.
• Limited user control and consent: Today the user is
typically “out of the loop” with regards to consent
regarding the information being asserted to by an
identity provider or attribute provider.
Over the past few years several efforts have sought to
address the issue of user control and consent (e.g. [20],
[21], [22]). The idea here is that not only should the
user explicitly consent to his or her attributes being
shared, the underlying identity system should also
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Fig. 3: Overview of Open Algorithms (OPAL) Architecture
ensure that only minimal disclosure is performed for
a constrained use among justifiable parties [23], [24].
III. OPEN ALGORITHMS: KEY CONCEPTS & PRINCIPLES
The concept of Open Algorithms (OPAL) evolved from
several research projects over the past decade within the
Human Dynamics Group at the MIT Media Lab. From various
research results it was increasingly becoming apparent that an
individual’s privacy could be affected through the correlation
of just small amounts of data [25], [26].
One noteworthy seed project was OpenPDS that sought to
develop further the concept of personal data stores (PDS) [27],
[28], by incorporating the idea of analytics on personal data
and the notion of “safe answers” as being the norm for
responses generated by a personal data store.
However, beyond the world of personal data stores there
remains the pressing challenges around how large data stores
are to secure their data, safeguard privacy and comply to
regulations (e.g. GDPR [5]) – while at the same time enable
productive collaborative data sharing. The larger the data
repository, the more attractive it would become to hackers and
attackers. As such, it became evident that the current mindset
of performing data analytics at a centralized location needed
to be replaced with a new paradigm for thinking about data
sharing in a distributed manner.
The OPAL paradigm provides a useful framework within
which industry can begin finding solutions for these con-
straints.
A. OPAL Principles
The following are the key concepts and principles under-
lying the open algorithms paradigm [1]:
• Moving the algorithm to the data: Instead of pulling
raw data into a centralized location for processing,
it is the algorithms that should be sent to the data
repositories and be processed there.
• Raw data must never leave its repository: Raw data
must never be exported from its repository, and must
always be under the control of its owner.
• Vetted algorithms: Algorithms must be vetted to be
“safe” from bias, discrimination, privacy violations
and other unintended consequences. The data owner
(data provider) must ensure that the algorithms which
it publishes have been thoroughly analyzed for safety
and privacy-preservation.
• Provide only safe answers: When executing an al-
gorithm on a data-set, the data repository must al-
ways provide responses that are deemed “safe” from
a privacy perspective. Responses must not release
personally identifying information (PII) without the
consent of the user (subject). This may imply that a
data repository return only aggregate answers.
• Trust Networks (Data Federation): In a group-based
information sharing configuration – referred to as
Trust Network for Data Sharing Federation – algo-
rithms must be vetted collectively by the trust network
members. Individually, each member must observe the
OPAL principles and operate on this basis. The oper-
ational aspects of the federation should be governed
by a legal trust framework (see Section V).
• Consent for algorithm execution: Data repositories that
hold subject data must obtain explicit consent from
the subject when this data is to be included in a given
algorithm execution.
This implies that as part of obtaining a subject’s
consent, the vetted algorithms should be made avail-
able and understandable to subjects. Consent should
be unambiguous and retractable (see Article 7 of
GDPR [5]). Standards for user-centric authorization
and consent-management [20], [22] exist today in
the identity industry, and which can be the basis for
managing subject consent in data repositories.
• Decentralized Data Architectures: By leaving raw data
in its repository, the OPAL paradigm points towards
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a decentralized architecture for data stores [26]. De-
centralized data architectures based on standardized
interfaces/APIs should be applicable to personal data
stores as legitimate end-points. That is, the OPAL
paradigm should be applicable regardless of the size
of the data-set.
New architectures based on Peer-to-Peer (P2P)
networks should be employed as the basis for new
decentralized data stores [29]. Since data is a valuable
asset, the proper design of a decentralized architec-
ture should aim at increasing the resiliency of the
overall system against attacks (e.g. data theft, poison-
ing, manipulations, etc). New distributed data security
solutions based on secure multi-party computation
(e.g. MIT Enigma [30]) and homomorphic encryption,
should be further developed.
Additionally, a decentralized service architecture
should enhance distributed data stores. Such a service
architecture should introduce automation in the pro-
visioning and de-provisioning of services through the
use of smart contracts technology [31].
It is important to note that the term “algorithm” itself has
been left intentionally undefined. This is because each OPAL
deployment instance must have the flexibility to define the
semantics and syntax of their algorithms. In the case of a
community of data providers organized under a trust network,
they must collectively agree on the semantics and syntax in the
operational sense. Such a definition should be a core part of
the legal trust framework underlying the federated community.
B. OPAL Query-Response Model
From a technological perspective, the OPAL model is fairly
simple to understand (see Figure 3). A querier entity (e.g.
person or organization) that wishes to obtain information from
a given data provider selects one or more vetted algorithms
(Step (a)).
In the MIT software implementation of OPAL, each al-
gorithm is encapsulated in a “template” format that contains
the algorithm description, its algorithm-ID, the identifier of
the intended (target) repository, the data-schema, and other
parameters (e.g. cost to querier). The algorithm template itself
is digitally signed (e.g. by the data provider or algorithm
author) to ensure the source-authenticity of the template.
For a given algorithm, Querier uses this template to con-
struct an “OPAL contract” (a JSON data structure) which
contains among others the desired Algorithm-ID. The contract
is digitally signed by the Querier and sent to the target data
repository. This is shown as Step (b) in Figure 3. Optionally
the querier may attach payment in order to remunerate the data
repository.
The data repository validates the signature on the OPAL
contract, checks the identity of the Querier and executes the
algorithm (corresponding to the Algorithm-ID) on the target
data-set in its back-end.
The results are then placed into a “OPAL contract-
response” (another JSON data structure) by the data provider,
digitally signed and returned to the Querier. This is shown
as Step (c) in Figure 3. Optionally, if confidentiality of the
query/response is required then the relevant entries in the
OPAL contract and contract-response could be encrypted.
C. OPAL-based Data Sharing Federation
In a data sharing federation configuration (e.g. consortium
of data providers), the federation may employ a gateway entity
that coordinates queries/responses they receive from each other
(or from outside if the federation permits). This is shown in
Figure 4.
Here the gateway entity mediates requests coming from the
querier entity and directs them to the appropriate member data
provider. The gateway also collates responses and packages
the responses prior to transmitting to the querier. Note that
a member data provider may always decline to respond (e.g.
data unavailable, it detects attempts to send multiple related
queries, etc.).
Currently, small test-bed deployments of the basic open
algorithms concept are underway for specific and narrow data-
domains [32], [33].
IV. OPAL FOR IDENTITY FEDERATION
Instead of the exchange of static attributes regarding a user
or subject, identity providers and data providers should collec-
tively share vetted algorithms following the open algorithms
paradigm. This is summarized in Figure 5.
• Algorithms instead of attributes: Rather than deliv-
ering static attributes (e.g. “Joe is a resident of NY
City”) to the relying party, allow instead the relying
party to choose one or more vetted algorithms from a
given data domain (Step (a)).
The result from executing a chosen algorithm is then
conveyed by the IdP to the relying party in a signed
response (Step (c)). The response can also include
various metadata embellishments, such as the duration
of the validity of the response (e.g. for dynamically
changing data sets), identification of the data-sets
used, consent-receipts, timestamps, and so on.
• Convergence of Federations: Identity federation net-
works should engage data provider networks (data
owners) in a collaborative manner, with the goal of
converging the two types of networks.
The goal should be to bring together data providers
from differing domains or verticals (e.g. telco data,
health data, finance data, etc) in such a manner that
new insights can be derived about a subject with their
consent based on the OPAL paradigm. Research has
shown, for example, that combining location data with
credit card data offers new insights into the financial
wellbeing of a user [34].
• Apply correct pricing models for algorithms and data:
For each algorithm and the data to which the algorithm
applies, a correct pricing structure needs to be devel-
oped by the members of the federation. This is not
only to remunerate the data repositories for managing
the data-sets and for executing the algorithm (i.e CPU
usage), but also to encourage data owners to develop
new business models based on the OPAL paradigm.
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Pricing information could published as part of
the vetted-algorithms declaration (e.g. as metadata),
offering different tiers of pricing for different sizes of
data sets. For example, the price for obtaining insights
into the creditworthiness of a subject based solely on
their credit card data should be different from the price
for obtaining insights based on combined data-sets
across domains (e.g. appropriate combination of GPS
data-set and credit card data-set) [2].
• Remunerate the subjects: A correct alignment of in-
centives must be found for all stakeholders in the
identity federation ecosystem. Subjects should see
some meaningful and measureable return on the use of
their data, even if it is tiny amounts (e.g. in the pennies
or sub-pennies). Returns should be measurable against
some measure of data the subject puts forward (e.g.
variety of data, duration of collection, etc).
The point here is that people will contribute more
personal data if they are active participants in the
ecosystem and understand the legal protections offered
by the trust frameworks that govern the data federation
and govern the treatment of their personal data by
member data providers.
• Logs for Transparency and Regulatory Compliance:
All requests and responses must be logged, together
with strong audit capabilities. Emerging technologies
such as blockchains and distributed ledgers could be
expanded to effect an efficient but immutable log of
events. Such a log will be relevant for post-event
auditing and for proving regulatory compliance.
Logging and audit is also crucial in order to
obtain social acceptance and consent from individuals
whose data is present within a data repository. Users
as stakeholders in the ecosystem must be able to see
what data is present within these repositories and to
see who is accessing their data through the execution
of vetted algorithms.
The use of the OPAL paradigm for information sharing
within an identity federation is summarized in Figure 5 using
the traditional Web-SSO flows. Figure 5 shows an alternate
flow pattern, which essentially replaces the attribute providers
in Figure 2 with the OPAL-based federation.
In Step 1 of Figure 5 when the user seeks the services of
the relying party, the relying party has the option to request the
execution of one or more of the vetted-algorithms as part of the
redirection of the user to the IdP for authentication (Step 2).
Thus, in addition to performing user-authentication the IdP
would forward requests for algorithm execution pertaining
to the user (as subject) to the data providers as federation
members (Step 4). Data providers whose repositories contain
data relevant to the relying party could respond to this request
from the IdP (Step 5). The IdP then relays these signed OPAL
responses to the relying party (Step 6).
Note that in Figure 5 the relying party could in fact
bypass the IdP by going straight to the Gateway and the Data
Federation. In this topology, the relying party would become
the querier and the Gateway itself could in fact play the dual
role of also being an IdP.
V. TRUST FRAMEWORK FOR OPAL FEDERATION
Today trust frameworks for identity management and feder-
ation in the US is based on three types or “layers” of law [35].
The foundational layer is the general commercial law that con-
sists of legal rules that are applicable to identity management
systems and transactions. This general commercial law was not
created specifically for identity management, but instead are
public law written and enacted by governments which applies
to all identity systems, its participants – and thus enforceable
in courts.
The second “layer” consist of general identity system law.
Such law is written to govern all identity systems within its
scope. The intent would be to address the various issues related
to the operations of the identity systems. The recognition of
the need for law at this layer is new, perhaps reflecting the
slow pace of development in the legal arena as compared to the
technology space. An example of this is the Virginia Electronic
Identity Management Act [36], which was enacted recently.
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The third “layer” is the set of applicable legal rules and
system-specific rules (i.e. specific to the identity system in
question). The term “trust framework” is often used to refer to
these system rules that have been adopted by the community.
A trust framework is needed for a group of entities to govern
their collective behavior, regardless if the identity system is
operated by the government or the private sector. In the case of
a private sector identity system, the governing body consisting
of the participants in the system typically drafts rules that take
the form of contracts-based rules, based on private law.
Examples of trust frameworks for identity federation today
are FICAM for federal employees [37], SAFE-BioPharma
Association [38] for the biopharmaceutical industry, and the
OpenID-Exchange (OIX) [35] for federation based on the
OpenID-Connect 1.0 model.
In order for an OPAL-based information sharing federation
to be developed, it should use and expand the current existing
legal trust frameworks for identity systems. This is because
the overall goal is for entities to obtain richer information
regarding a user (subject), and as such it must be bound to
the specific identity system rules. In other words, a new set
of third layer legal rules and system-specific rules must be
devised that must clearly articulate the required combination
of technical standards and systems, business processes and
procedures, and legal rules that, taken together, establish a
trustworthy system [18] for information sharing based on the
OPAL model. It is here that system-specific rules regarding the
“amount of private information released” must be created by
the federation community, involving all stakeholders including
the users (subjects).
Taking the parallel of an identity system, an OPAL-based
information sharing system must address the following:
• Verifying the correct matching between an identity
(connected to a human, legal entity, device, or digital
object) and the set of data in a repository pertaining
to that identity;
• Providing the correct result from an OPAL-based
computation to the party that requires it to complete
a transaction;
• Maintaining and protecting the private data within
repositories over its lifecycle.
• Defining the legal framework that defines the rights
and responsibilities of the parties, allocates risk, and
provides a basis for enforcement.
Similar to – and building upon – an identity system
operating rules, new additional operating rules need to be
created for an OPAL-based information sharing system. There
are two (2) components to this. The first is the business
and technical operational rules and specifications necessary to
make the OPAL-based system functional and trustworthy. The
second is the contract-based legal rules that (in addition to
applicable laws and regulations) define the rights and legal
obligations of the parties specific to the OPAL-based system
and facilitate enforcement where necessary.
As the current work is intended to focus on the concepts
and principles of open algorithms and their application to
information sharing in the identity context, these two aspects
will be subject for future work.
VI. CONSENT MANAGEMENT IN OPAL
The OPAL paradigm introduces an interesting perspective
on consent management, because the subject is asked to
consent to the execution of an algorithm. This is in contrast
to the prevailing mindset today [4] where the subject is asked
permission for the data provider to share the subject’s raw
data with other entities with whom the subject did not have a
transactional relationship.
Since the topic of consent is complex and outside the
scope of the current paper, we will only touch on it briefly by
providing an overview of how a consent management system
could augment an OPAL Data Provider deployment.
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A. Consent to Execute an Algorithm
Asking a subject’s permission to execute an algorithm on
their data and obtain “safe answers” is radically different from
asking the subject for permission to copy (or “share”) their
data to an external entity. This is true regardless if a “subject”
is an individual, an organization or a corporation. The OPAL
approach provides a greater degree of assurance to the subject
that the raw data-set remains where it is (one copy or few local
copies) and that the identity of the Querier is known.
In OPAL deployments the composition of the consent
notice and receipt should include at least the following:
• Algorithm and algorithm identification: This indicates
which vetted algorithm will be executed against the
data-set. This may be a list of multiple algorithms that
are designed and vetted to run against the data-set. An
implementation of OPAL may include references (e.g.
URIs, hashes, etc.) that point back to the signed tem-
plate which contains the complete algorithm expressed
in a given syntax.
• Data-set identification: Data-sets and copies of them
must be uniquely identifiable within an organization.
This could be a fixed identifier with local or global
scope, or an identifier (e.g. URI) that resolves to an
actual resource (i.e. file) containing the data-set.
• Data provider identification: This is the unique iden-
tity of the data provider which holds the subject’s
data. Examples include an X.509 certificate issued by
a valid Certificate Authority. Note that more complex
deployment cases may involve a Repository Operator
entity who hosts the OPAL data provider system but
does not have any legal ownership to the data.
• Querier identification: This is the unique identity of
the querier (e.g. X.509 certificate).
• Terms of use: This is the terms of use (or terms
of service) relating to the result of the execution of
the algorithm. A simplified easy-to-understand prose
must be included for readability by the subject. The
same terms of use (legal prose) must be presented to
the Querier (e.g. included in the algorithm “template”
description – see Section III-B).
B. The UMA Model for Consent Management
Given that the majority of social media platform providers
today are deploying architectures for identity management
and authorization based on the OAuth2.0 framework [16], it
makes technological sense to extend the rudimentary OAuth2.0
framework for the purposes of consent management. The
User Managed Access (UMA) profile [20], [21] of OAuth2.0
provides such an extension.
A high-level illustration of the UMA extensions and flows
in the context of the OPAL architecture is shown in Figure 6.
In Figure 6, the Subject as the Resource Owner (RO) pre-
defines his or her consent “rules” at the Consent Management
system in Step 1. The Consent Management system is the
UMA Authorization Server (AS). The system matches these
rules with the resources (e.g. files, data-sets, subsets, etc.)
belonging to the Subject as the Resource Owner in in Step 2.
After the Querier selects the Algorithm (Step 3), the
Querier must then obtain a “consent token” (a signed JSON
data structure) from the Consent Management system (Step 4).
The Querier binds the execution-request to the consent token
by digitally signing them together, prior to transmitting to the
Data Provider (Step 5). Finally, in Step 6 the repository returns
the response to the Querier.
A key contribution of the UMA extension of OAuth2.0 is
its recognition that in practice the Client is a web-application
operated by the Client Operator (CO) as separate legal entity
from the user (Querier). Similarly the Resource Server (RS)
containing the subject’s resources may be operated by a
separate legal entity from the subject.
Note that the basic OAuth2.0 framework [16] does not
recognize the notion of operators of services (e.g. third parties).
As such OAuth2.0 does not distinguish between the Client
web-application (to which the user connects via their browser)
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from the Client Operator entity which legally owns and op-
erates the web-application. This is turn leads to the possi-
bility of the operator providing the remote web-application
service without any legal obligations to the querier or the
resource owner. More specifically, the operator of the web-
application can “listen in” (eavesdrop) to any query/response
traffic between the querier and the data provider. This allows
the operator to obtain data and information through backdoor
access via the web-application which they legally own.
In the context of OPAL in Figure 6 there is an additional
need to provide legal recognition of the different entities in
the data sharing ecosystem. This includes the Subjects, the
Data Owner, the Client Operator and the Repository Operator.
The Data Owner legally owns (or co-owns) the collated data,
the algorithms and the information derived from the raw data.
Individually, the Subject owns a small portion of the raw data-
set in the repository. In the case where the OPAL infrastructure
is hosted, the Repository Operator also has legal obligations
(e.g. not copying or leaking raw data).
VII. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Currently there is great interest in the use of artificial
intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) techniques to
obtain better insight into data for various use-cases. For the
OPAL paradigm, there are several possible areas of interest:
• Distributed Machine Learning: The principle of leav-
ing raw data in their repositories points to deploy-
ment architectures based on distributed data stores
and distributed computation. Corresponding to this
architecture is the use of machine learning techniques
in a distributed manner to improve performance.
In an architecture with distributed instances of OPAL
data providers (data servers), one approach could be
to train the algorithm separately at each data server
instance. Each data server instance could hold slightly
different training data-sets. The model trained at each
data server instance would then be serialized and made
available to the remote Querier. The OPAL principles
remain enforced, where the Querier does not see the
raw data but obtains the benefit of distributed data
stores performing independent training.
• Fairness and accountability: Fairness has been of con-
cern to researchers in the area of machine learning for
some time. A key aspect of interest is in ensuring non-
discrimination, transparency and understandability of
data driven decision-making (e.g. see [2], [39]).
For the OPAL paradigm fairness is crucial in the
vetting process for new algorithms in the context of
a given data and use-case. Transparency is a factor in
obtaining consent for including data within an given
OPAL-based data federation.
• Algorithms expressed as smart contracts: Once an
algorithm has been vetted to be safe to run against
a given data-set, it can be expressed as a smart
contract for a given blockchain system or distributed
ledger platform. Here a smart contract is defined to
be the combined executable code and legal-prose [40],
digitally signed and distributed on the P2P nodes of
a blockchain system. The legal prose would include
statements on the terms of use for the resulting re-
sponse for privacy and regulatory compliance pur-
poses.
Depending on the type of blockchain system (per-
missioned, permissionless, semi-anonymous) the al-
gorithm itself may be publicly readable. The querier
(caller) must invoke the smart-contract algorithm ac-
companied with payment, which will be escrowed
until the completion of the execution of the algorithm
upon the intended data-set.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The identity problem of today is essentially a problem of
data – and more specifically a problem of privacy-preserving
data sharing.
This paper has described the concepts and principles un-
derlying the open algorithms (OPAL) paradigm. The OPAL
paradigm offers a possible way forward for industry and
government to begin addressing the core issues around privacy-
preserving data sharing. Some of these challenges include
siloed data, the limited type/domain of data, and the prohibitive
situation of cross-organization sharing of raw data.
Instead of sharing fixed-attributes regarding a user or sub-
ject, the OPAL paradigm offers a way for Identity Providers,
Relying Parties and Data Providers to share vetted algorithms.
This in turn provides better insight into the user’s behavior,
with their consent. It also allows for the development of a
trust network ecosystem consisting of these entities, providing
new revenue sources, governed by relevant legal agreements
and contracts that form the basis for a information sharing
legal trust framework.
Finally, a new set of legal rules and system-specific rules
must be devised that must clearly articulate the required com-
bination of technical standards and systems, business processes
and procedures, and legal rules that, taken together, establish
a trustworthy system for information sharing in a federation
based on the OPAL model.
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